REVIEW

Cybersecurity challenges and opportunities of machine learning-based artificial intelligence

Pawel Czaja[1] · Bartlomiej Gdowski[1] · Marcin Niemiec[1] · Wim Mees[2] · Nikolai Stoianov[3] · Konstantinos Votis[4] · Vyacheslav Kharchenko[5] · Vasilis Katos[6] · Matteo Merialdo[7]

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Abstract
Artificial intelligence, machine learning, and cybersecurity are the topics of discussion of contemporary information technology sector and computing research. This study investigates the integration of machine learning-based artificial intelligence in the context of cybersecurity. This paper presents an overview of the recent literature, focusing on selected popular areas related to the challenges and opportunities that such implementations introduce. The authors also assess how selected problems related to the application of machine learning algorithms affect the real effectiveness represented by the resulting models. To support this analysis, an experimental study was conducted using a real-world cybersecurity system. This demonstration illustrates the practical implementation of a machine learning-based software solution in cybersecurity and highlights the potential challenges encountered during such implementations.

Keywords Cybersecurity · Artificial intelligence · Machine learning · Intrusion detection

Mathematics Subject Classification 68M25 · 68T01 · 68T05

1 Introduction

In general, artificial intelligence (AI) is the ability of algorithms to take action—based on a previously conducted learning process—for cases that have not been precisely defined. Unlike commonly used algorithms in programming, AI allows searching for patterns in a set of processed data, which can then be used for new classification, regression, or clustering of data. The unique opportunities that such systems provide, the ease of implementation or integration of newer approaches, and the overall accessibility for—even a non-technical user—all add up to a huge gain of popularity of AI-based solutions. This is especially significant in the present and coming times, due to the increase in the volume of data exchanged between devices, the number of which is also growing rapidly. For this reason, one can observe increase of AI-oriented solutions usage in the context of cybersecurity.

While Artificial Super Intelligence—a type of intelligence far beyond the human brain's ability to process data, cognition, and abstract thinking—is currently only a hypothetical concept, and Artificial General Intelligence—a system capable of solving a wide range of problems, matching the human brain in terms of abstract thinking—has no practical implementations, we have a broad range of usable AI solutions. For example, a group of algorithm-based solutions called Machine Learning (ML) is being widely implemented in Internet of Things (IoT) solutions,

cloud environments, etc. This paper provides a review of both certain challenges as well as potential opportunities of leveraging ML-based AI solutions to solve the problems associated with cybersecurity.

This study aims to conduct a set of tests and a review of scientific publications focused on selected areas of the topic of using ML-based AI in the field of cybersecurity. In particular, in the context of the challenges and opportunities that this topic introduces. The core of the study will be split into two main sections oriented on the following questions.

- **What are the cybersecurity-related challenges of Machine Learning-based artificial intelligence implementations?**
- **What are the opportunities of Machine Learning-based artificial intelligence application in cybersecurity solutions?**

2 Methods

To answer the aforementioned questions, a comprehensive literature search was performed. Of several available databases, the most popular, Scopus, has been chosen. The main searches were conducted with the following groups of keywords and their (grammatically correct) combinations: {"artificial intelligence" or "machine learning" or "deep learning" or "neural networks"} and {"challenge" or "threat" or "attack" or "opportunity" or "possibility" or "security"}. The results were restricted to papers published not earlier than in 2019—to keep a 5-year time frame (at the time of writing) that should ensure that the relevance factor of the research. As each of the searches resulted in a few tens of thousands of results, for the subsequent searches, the authors have chosen several subcategories for further analysis, based on both the authors' areas of interest and the most popular publication topics. Each of those topics has a dedicated subsection in the paper in which selected research is presented—no analysis of the results obtained from the database has been conducted. In addition to the literature found in the database indicated above, the authors have also included other papers that cover specific scopes that they were familiar with. Additionally, a couple of topics have been researched by the authors themselves, through implementation of a project allowing to analyze a few ML algorithms. In total, the paper includes 84 references, including books, websites, conference papers, and journal publications.

3 What are the cybersecurity-related challenges of Machine Learning-based artificial intelligence implementations?

The use of ML in the cybersecurity context involves several problems that should be solved or at least mitigated before introduction into production environments to take full advantage of these solutions. Cybersecurity-related challenges for AI implementation can be grouped based on a set of questions (Kharchenko et al. [1]):

- Q1: Is the analyzed system based on AI?
- Q2: Does the system utilize AI for protection?
- Q3: Are the attacks powered by AI?

If an answer to Q1 is *"yes,"* then specific threats and vulnerabilities of AI-based systems should be taken into account, as in these cases AI is the object of protection (Meyer et al. [2], Cotroneo et al. [3]). In case of a positive answer to Q2, we have the case of AI-powered protection—an efficiency of such approach should be assessed and the means of protection should be chosen or developed to meet the requirements ([3], de Azambuja et al. [4]). In the most challenging scenarios, where AI is the tool used for attacks—Q3 $\Rightarrow$ *"yes"*—then additional threats, vulnerabilities, and risks of successful AI-powered attacks should be assessed (Yu et al. [5]).

3.1 Features correlation

In case of ML, the input of the classifier is often datasets with as many features as possible, to maximize the probability of correct prediction. However, the features extracted from a given dataset may be interdependent, showing a high rate of autocorrelation. In an extreme case, when the absolute value of the autocorrelation index is close to 100%, it may turn out that a given feature is considered more than once. The tests were carried out with the use of a ready-made project in Python 3 programming language implementing and verifying the effectiveness of the 7 most popular ML algorithms [6]: *Gaussian Naive Bayes (GNB)*, *Decision Tree (DT)*, *Random Forest (RF)*, *Support Vector Machine (SVM)*, *Logistic Regression (LogR)*, *Gradient Boosting Classifier (GBC)*, and *Artificial Neural Network (ANN)*, as different ML algorithms respond differently to duplicate features in the training dataset, depending on the degree of autocorrelation of the features included in the training dataset. For convenience of the presentation and data analysis, the authors have modified the project. The project was prepared in *Jupyter Notebook*, which allowed it to be opened in the *Google Colab* environment, using the resources offered by cloud computing.

The aforementioned project has been expanded in such a way that, in addition to measuring accuracy, it also calculates metrics such as precision, recall, and F1score. The metrics have been defined with the following formulas:

$$\text{Accuracy} = \frac{\text{True Positive} + \text{True Negative}}{\text{Number of all classifications}} \qquad \text{Precision} = \frac{\text{True Positive}}{\text{True Positive} + \text{False Positive}}$$

$$\text{Recall} = \frac{\text{True Positive}}{\text{True Positive} + \text{False Negative}} \qquad \text{F1score} = 2 * \frac{\text{Precision} * \text{Recall}}{\text{Precision} + \text{Recall}}$$

The terms: True Positive (TP), True Negative (TN), False Positive (FP), False Negative (FN) refer to the prediction result in relation to the actual label of the specific test sample. The first part of the formula: true/false means that the sample has been classified correctly or incorrectly, in relation to the real category. In turn, the second part: positive/negative informs if the classifier predicted a given category or if the prediction resulted in a category different from the given one.

For training and testing purposes, the *KDD Cup'99* dataset was used. This dataset remains a preferred choice for foundational experiments because of its extensive documentation, well-understood structure, realism, and feature diversity. Additionally, it is one of the most popular datasets used in research on the use of ML in the context of IDS. Each entry in this dataset contains a set of features extracted from Transmission Control Protocol (TCP)/Internet Protocol (IP) packets generated to emulate network traffic representing a specific type of attack or typical client behavior. All packets have been marked with one of 23 classes, which can be divided into 5 main categories listed below.

- **Normal**—reference traffic reflecting the typical behavior of network clients.
- **Denial of Service (DoS)**—an example of attacks aimed at limiting the availability of a given network service.
- **Remote to Login (R2L)**—an attempt of unauthorized access to a given device.
- **User to Root (U2R)**—privilege escalation by unauthorized granting of administrator privileges to an authenticated user.
- **Probe**—active network reconnaissance, the purpose of which is to detect active network services.

The *KDD Cup'99* dataset originally contains 41 features extracted from the captured packets; some of them evidence in a high autocorrelation index. In order to identify the features with a high autocorrelation index, one can use a heatmap, a type of plot that graphically shows the degree of autocorrelation between specific datasets, which in the discussed case represent individual features. For the purpose of the experiments, a function using the Pearson method has been used to determine the standard correlation coefficient. The heatmap presented in Fig. 1 shows the result of the discussed functions in the context of the *KDD Cup'99* dataset.

Heatmap is a type of matrix that allows visual notice of features that potentially exhibit a very high or extremely low autocorrelation coefficient but does not clearly correspond to the values of these variables. For this

purpose, it is necessary to additionally calculate the value of the autocorrelation index of the features for which the cells on the heatmap have a color close to white or black. This methodology was also chosen for the experiments discussed. Then, four acceptable thresholds of the absolute value of the autocorrelation coefficients were selected: 98%, 100%, 90%, and 80%. In case of features whose autocorrelation index was higher than the set threshold, one of the features was removed from the dataset. This resulted in the need to remove 12 features with a threshold equal to 80%, 9 features with the threshold 90%, and 8 features with the threshold 98%. With the threshold set to 100%, no feature has been removed. The results obtained are presented in the graph in Fig. 2, which was created based on the data collected. The heatmaps used during each test, as well as the collected data, are available online on the project's GitHub website [7].

The received results clearly show that the greatest differences in terms of accuracy in subsequent experiments concern the GNB algorithm. This is because GNB assumes the independence of features, so in the case of a high correlation value of two different features, they are in practice treated as a single feature with bigger weight than the other ones. For this reason, the GNB-based algorithm is the most exposed of all the algorithms mentioned



Fig. 1 Standard correlation coefficient for KDD Cup'99 dataset features.

above to a decrease in accuracy caused by an increased share of redundant information and duplicate entries in the dataset used in the learning process.

3.2 Attacks against machine learning

ML undoubtedly offers great opportunities in the context of practical applications. However, like other algorithms, ML has some distinctive features that attackers can use to compromise this type of system. Depending on the stage at which malicious actions are taken, attacks against ML can be divided into those related to the learning phase and those related to the testing phase (Xue et al. [8]). Example types of attacks are provided below.

- Learning phase-related attacks:
  - **Data poisoning**—An attack aimed at reducing the performance of the created classifier by adding malicious samples to the training dataset.
  - **Backdoor**—The introduction of samples into the training dataset that will not interfere with the overall performance of the classifier, but, in well-defined circumstances, will lead to deliberate erroneous prediction.
- Testing phase-related attacks:
  - **Adversarial Machine Learning**—Attack consisting of finding a way to modify samples in such a way that the classifier would have a high probability of classifying them incorrectly.
  - **Recovery of training data**—An attempt to recreate a training dataset based on interaction with the functioning classifier.

3.2.1 Data poisoning

Liu et al. [9] proposed a FL attack. It is an interesting approach, as FL is usually presented as a secure approach, used for data protection. The attack modifies feature fields with high weights, while ignoring the low weight features. Using this process, the learning process is disrupted, but at the same time, the impact on the data is rather low, which allows for a stealth approach, proving that such attacks may become a real threat.



Fig. 2 Accuracy for the different thresholds of the acceptable correlation coefficients.

Al-Qudah et al. [10] presented the use of data poisoning in the context of bypassing the facial recognition-based biometric authentication system. The proposed method is an incremental attack that is executed during the training phase of NN. Despite being a gray box approach (in this case, meaning that the attack can be executed without the attacker's knowledge of NN structure), the attack was able to decrease the confidence in the results by 15–25% for three different deep classifiers. At the same time, the F1 score has decreased by less than 2% in each case, which classifies the attack as a rather stealth approach.

3.2.2 Backdoor

Sasaki et al. [11] demonstrated the methodology for placing a backdoor in an ML-based malware detection system. They also discuss a mathematical formula that allows a given sample to be transformed into a malicious one that will be misclassified. The experiments carried out within the article proved that the intentional incorporation of a backdoor into the classifier, which will become visible only under strictly defined circumstances, is effective and difficult to detect because of the lack of influence on the overall performance of the classifier.

Xu et al. [12] presented a poisoning-based backdoor attack in the form of classical spatial transformations as trigger patterns. The method is based on training the algorithm by transforming a set of objects: some with a specific parameter (in this case a specified angle) changing their labels to the target label after the transformation, and some with a random parameter, keeping their labels without any changes. For presentation, the algorithm learning process was conducted on a set consisting of photographs of traffic signs and then tested on photographs made by the authors. The results are presented in Fig. 3.

Chathoth and Lee in [13] introduce a novel backdoor poisoning technique designed for network traffic data in Cyber-Physical Systems and IoT environments. The proposed solution is at the same time an example of data poisoning attack, as the authors demonstrate how subtle manipulations of PCAP files can implant hidden backdoors into deep learning-based intrusion detection systems without significantly affecting their overall performance on clean data. Interestingly, the method remains effective even with very low poisoning rates, posing a serious threat to the reliability and security of ML models in real-world network scenarios. This work highlights the critical need for robust defense mechanisms against stealthy backdoor attacks in ML-enabled cybersecurity applications.



Fig. 3 An example of a backdoor attack from [12].

3.2.3 Adversarial machine learning

Zhou and He [14] proposed a technique of attack on a network traffic by adding as little disturbance as possible, while causing the defending model to output incorrect classification results. This approach uses the One Pixel Tabu Search (OPTS) algorithm which—as the name suggests—searches for one, best pixel which, when changed, will trick the defending mechanisms. OPTS is an iterative algorithm, with implementation of decision-making judgment based on a table of solutions. The authors compare the deception rate of OPTS and a few tabu search algorithms based on the perturbation of all pixels on a convolutional NN model. While the solution presented in the research is not the best in the comparison group, it is very close to the best one, proving that adversarial attacks may be built based on a single pixel change and still be very hard to identify.

Today, Large Language Model (LLM) solutions are a part of our daily lives. An important part of the development of such model is to perform an alignment process—in other words, encoding human values and goals to make LLMs both helpful and safe at the same time. Zou et al. [15] presented a few methods for overriding the models' limitations and, in result, performing an adversary attack. The approach list consists of both universally harmful prompts and methods of *"manipulating"* the model to retrieve previously unavailable data. The method introduced by the authors had the highest success rate compared to a few different recently published solutions. Figure 4 presents an example of harmful strings generated by the algorithm and a few popular LLMs responses to those prompts. What is worth noting, at the time of the research publication, is an approach consisting of simply instructing LLM to start the answer with *"Sure, here's"* significantly increasing the attack success rate for most tested models.

A more recent approach to defending against similar adversarial techniques was presented by Chen et al. in [16], where the authors introduced the *DYNAMITE* framework—a dynamic defense strategy designed to enhance ML-based intrusion detection systems against adversarial attacks. Unlike static models vulnerable to carefully designed perturbations, this method dynamically selects among multiple defense mechanisms to increase resilience while minimizing computational overhead. The study demonstrated a significant improvement in detection performance and robustness, especially in highly volatile or adaptive network environments, highlighting the growing importance of flexible defense strategies in modern cybersecurity applications.

Koball et al. present an example of an evasion attack in [17]. The authors investigate the vulnerability of tree-based classifiers (including RF and DT) to carefully designed adversarial examples designed to mislead the model. Through extensive experiments on benchmark datasets, the study demonstrates that even small, carefully crafted input changes can significantly degrade classification accuracy.

3.2.4 Recovery of training data

According to Xue et al. [8], the last-mentioned category of ML attacks can be divided into two types.

- **Membership inference attack**—in the case of which the classifier is queried, which allows an attacker to determine whether or not the particular sample belonged to the training dataset of the original classifier.
- **Model inversion attack**—a generalization of the previous type of attack, where the attacker recreates all or part of the original private training dataset, despite not knowing the potential samples.

The proposal of *model inversion attack* is described in detail by Jin et al. [18]. The developed algorithm is called: *CAFE*, which stands for *Catastrophic Data Leakage in Vertical Federated Learning*. The attack consists of recreating images belonging to the private training dataset, using only the information shared in the Federated Learning(FL) model, which is broadly described in the next section. The result of carrying out this type of attack, along with a comparison to other known methods, is presented in Fig. 5. It can be seen that using the *CAFE* technique, it was possible to faithfully recreate the photographs that were used in the supervised learning process, while other methods only partially reconstructed the objects visible in the original photographs, the contours of which can be seen among the noise.



Fig. 4 An example of a adversarial attack from [15].

3.3 Attacks utilizing machine learning

ML could be a tool that we use to ensure the security of our network, but it can be used as well as a *"weapon."* The main problem with AI-based attacks is that they are much less predictable than conventional attacks, due to the adaptive learning ability of some of the algorithms.

Veprytska and Kharchenko [19] conducted a complex analysis and *Intrusion Modes and Effects Criticality Analysis (IMECA)* risk assessment of AI-based attacks such as password guessing, CAPTCHA guessing, automatic penetration, and automated phishing. It should be noted that most of the attacks presented were evaluated with high risk or severity, while others were assessed as at least medium risk/severity, which means that there is a need for countermeasures to mitigate the risks presented by AI-based attacks.

Guembe et al. [20] analyzed nearly 50 papers related to AI-driven attacks. Attack strategies included the following approaches: DL, bioinspired computation, swarm intelligence, and fuzzy model. Algorithms used for these attacks include CNN, LSTM, RF, or SVM. The authors have identified that in selected articles AI is used at almost every stage of a cyberattack: reconnaissance, access & penetration, delivery, exploitation, command & control, and action on objectives. This may suggest that in the near future it may be possible to execute a fully AI-driven attack.

Gupta et al. [21] analyzed the ways to exploit *ChatGPT*, a generative AI by *OpenAI* project. As the authors have presented, the publicly available version of the generator can be attacked using a method called *jailbreak*. Although such an operation is a type of adversarial attack (like in [15]), the attacked LLM may be used further for malicious activity. With *"correct"* prompts, one can generate code that can be used to attack some system (e.g., database injection or firewall bypass payloads), simple virus programs (such as ransomware, or spyware) or create credible messages or emails than can be used for social engineering attacks.



Fig. 5 An example of an model inversion attack from [18].

3.4 Models development

In case of real implementations of AI-based systems, the following three factors play an important role.

- The processing time needed to obtain the results after the input has been entered.
- Computing resources (disk space, RAM, CPU) necessary to maintain such a system.
- The ability of the system to be updated without downtime.

According to Raza et al. [22] that focus on the implementation of AI-based solutions in the context of spam detection, the above-mentioned problems are most often not discussed in publications proposing the implementation of ML models. If the implemented system is too slow, it may turn out that the prediction result will be returned after the event that was to be predicted already takes place. Excessive consumption of computing resources may make system maintenance unprofitable or even impossible. In turn, the inability to update the system without a downtime may be associated with postponing such an update over time, which may reduce its accuracy. However, there is no doubt that these are areas that should be improved in order to achieve the effectiveness of non-AI-based solutions.

4 What are the opportunities of Machine Learning-based artificial intelligence application in cybersecurity solutions?

Current AI implementations offer a number of possibilities in the context of solving tasks, in which it is necessary to follow certain fixed patterns, and demonstrate the ability to notice some templates. These types of application are particularly useful in cybersecurity, as they significantly speed up the manual work of cybersecurity experts.

Moreover, they discover dependencies that are impossible to find from the human perspective. The following section presents selected practical applications of AI in the context of cybersecurity.

4.1 Intrusion detection system

IDS systems can be divided into two main types: Network Intrusion Detection System (NIDS) and Host Intrusion Detection System (HIDS). In both cases, they are used to warn the end user or administrator of a given system about a threat that may be an attack aimed at the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of data processed by the system. However, as the names themselves indicate, in case of NIDS, the measurement is carried out at the network level, through the analysis of transmitted packets, while in case of HIDS, the threat is searched for at the end-device level.

In order to implement an IDS system in practice, it is necessary to determine which processes or packet flows are expected and which are malicious and may indicate an attack being carried out. To achieve this, one of the two main types of approaches to IDS design can be used: misuse detection and abnormal detection. In the first case, signatures of known attacks are used, e.g., by using hash functions to make a library of binary sequences that are correlated with malicious behaviors. Unfortunately, this type of solution will not work in case of 0-day attacks, i.e., exploitation of vulnerabilities that have been recently discovered and therefore have not been added yet to the database of known attacks. Similarly, it would be practically useless in the case of attacks that have been deliberately obfuscated, i.e., modified in such a way as to effectively exploit a given vulnerability but do it in an unusual way. This is where AI is used, and more precisely ML algorithms, which allow detection of malicious behavior even in case of 0-day attacks or malware obfuscation. Therefore, there is also a second approach that focuses on looking for patterns that suggest an attack or malicious behavior. AI was used in both of these categories.

4.1.1 Classification models

In most research throughout recent years (Leghris et al. [23], Enigo et al. [24], Barach et al. [25]), the starting point for the development of a NIDS or HIDS system is to obtain training data that will be used to create a classifier. It is also possible to use ready-made datasets intended for training, which are already properly pre-processed into numerical forms, such as the aforementioned *KDD Cup'99* or *NSL-KDD*. It is crucial to extract individual features from the collected data and label them corresponding to the class. The data extraction process should be automated, as predicted samples will also need to enable the adaptation of the processed data to the input requirements of the classifier. This can be achieved, for instance, by preparing a *Python 3* script that will process captured packets and then extract a set of features from each of them. ML classifiers are algorithms that can only process numerical values, so if selected features are represented in a different form, for instance, by protocol names, they should be mapped to numerical values. In the next step, the training dataset can be subjected to additional analysis in order to remove features with a high correlation index or duplicate samples. As the research presented in this paper showed, this may positively affect the accuracy of the created classifier.

On the basis of this training dataset, the ML classifier is created. The system thus developed is most often combined with the signature-based IDS, which is referred to as the hybrid approach. This allows us to use advantages of both solutions, the high efficiency of detection of known attacks by the signature-based approach, as well as the ability to detect unknown attacks provided by ML classifiers.

Sun et al. [26] proposed a different way of practical implementation of the ML classification for an open-source based NIDS which is *Snort*. It is an open-source system for detecting threats based on a number of defined rules. The authors were able to demonstrate a significant increase in the effectiveness of the system developed in this way, which, compared to the base version of *Snort*, was characterized by a reduction of more than 25% false positive alerts related to the detection of selected DOS attacks. Furthermore, it was possible to greatly reduce excessive alerts for *Mail bomb* attacks (by almost 99%), which also fall under the category of DOS attacks. To

achieve this goal, the authors used the *KDD Cup'99* dataset, from which, thanks to the *Life Cycle Cost Random Forest Recursive Feature Elimination* method, they extracted the optimal key features set, that characterize DOS attacks. Then, using the set of obtained features, additional rules were generated and added to *Snort*, on the basis of which an anomaly detection process was performed.

4.1.2 Clustering models

IDS systems are rarely built solely on the basis of the clustering algorithm, because it does not clearly answer which class of attack the selected sample belongs to. However, the implementation of the clustering algorithm in the context of the anomaly detection system allows to group the collected data into a certain number of categories and thus see the relationship between selected clusters, which may help to define a completely new class of malicious behavior.

Ze-Dong et al. [27] proposed a method of clustering based on entropy. The dataset is split into groups, which allows to focus on categorized features. To differentiate the clusters, the malicious traffic categories are characterized using conditional entropy. The data are further processed and evaluated either as normal or malicious. The authors have presented that the algorithm had a very high accuracy, when tested on a realistic cyberdefense dataset.

Duan et al. [28] presented a dynamic K-Nearest Neighbors (KNN) clustering algorithm to detect outliers in the data of telecom traffic. It is worth noting that the authors used real data, collected for 4 years from a province of a telecom company. Compared to existing KNN algorithms, the author's algorithm does not select a random clustering center, which allows to perform fewer iterations. Additionally, the number of clusters is not predefined, but instead the algorithm dynamically adds new clusters, so not only is the proposed solution faster than other KNN-based implementations, but also it has wider usage possibilities.

4.1.3 Hybrid models

The classification and clustering approaches can be combined. An example of such a system is *IDS* proposed by Liang et al. [29]. It was proved that preceding the classifier learning phase by clustering data into several subsets helps to significantly simplify the obtained models and thus increase its accuracy. As the clustering algorithm, the authors have chosen KMC, with k parameter values belonging to the set: $\{2,3,4\}$. In turn, the SVM with Gaussian kernel function algorithm was used to develop the classifier. The results of the conducted experiments showed an improvement in accuracy and a decrease in the time required to train a specific model with an increase in the value of the parameter k. Other implementations of KMC have been described by Younisse and Al-Haija [30] and Chen [31].

Another approach is called fuzzy clustering. It is an unsupervised grouping of data into clusters with varying weights or probabilities. Liu et al. [32] proposed a solution based on a NN in which all input vectors are used as an input for all of the hidden vectors. The algorithm first processes the original data to reduce its volume for further analysis, and then the data are classified. The method proposed by the authors is much more effective in data classification, compared to both solutions separately. Another approach to fuzzy clustering has been described by Mi et al. [33]—the authors propose a solution that does not require the number of clusters to be defined.

Mamatha et al. proposed a more recent hybrid solution in [34]. The authors developed an intrusion detection system that leverages stacked feature selectors such as Random Boruta Selector, Relief, Pearson's coefficient, and Stacked learning classifiers, combined with an optimized classification architecture. Their approach integrates both filter and wrapper methods to identify the most relevant features and applies a multilayer classifier ensemble for threat detection. The experimental results confirmed high accuracy and reduced false positive rates, demonstrating the effectiveness of combining feature selection and ensemble learning in complex cybersecurity scenarios.

4.2 Malware detection in mobile applications

The smartphone market is developing very dynamically, as evidenced by the increase in the number of mobile devices sold each year. These devices store confidential information. In addition, very often smartphone users carry them everywhere, while being constantly online. Due to the factors mentioned above, it is very important to be able to identify the application or its elements that may contain malware. This can be done in two ways: by dynamic and static analysis.

4.2.1 Static analysis

Static analysis consists of examining the source code, binaries, or supporting files used by a given application. It can be performed independently from the operation of the device's operating system as well as of the virtual environment of the application. The first step to perform this type of analysis is usually decompiling the application into source codes, as well as an XML manifest file, where information on requested permissions, declared permissions, or intent filters can be found. However, manual analysis of this type of data is very tedious and time-consuming. On the other hand, the signature-based approach is not effective in the case of 0-day attacks. To solve this problem, AI can be used, as proposed by D'Ambrosio and Li [35]. The authors of the publication managed to develop a DL-based malware detection approach. By operating on features extracted from the manifest files, they were able to prepare a deep belief network classifier and list its performance metrics.

A similar approach was described by Garg and Yadav [36]. In this case, instead of analyzing the manifest files obtained as a result of decompiling the application, the direct binary file of the application was analyzed using the *IDA-Pro* tool. It is an application that allows to analyze system instructions invoked by the application, including Application Programming Interface (API) calls. Then, for the features distinguished in this way, a supervised learning process was carried out for a few selected well-known classification algorithms, which resulted in the development of classifier models. As shown in the conducted experiments, the most accurate in the predictions turned out to be the model based on SVM, the accuracy of which exceeded 98%.

4.2.2 Dynamic analysis

The second way to analyze an application in terms of malware content is the so-called dynamic analysis. The name comes from the fact that the application is examined in an environment specially launched for this purpose, named *sandbox*. After launching the application, its interactions with the operating system and other applications, as well as network calls, are observed, for instance, via Application Programming Interface(API). Thanks to this, it is possible to analyze the actions that are performed by the given software in practice. As with static analysis, ML can be used to improve this operation. An example of the implementation of such a system was presented by Mahdavifar et al. [37]. To carry out the experiments, the *CopperDroid* tool was used. It allows running the application in a virtual machine-based sandbox and then traces both low-level and high-level interactions of the application with the operating system. Then, the results of this analysis are saved in a standardized form in the JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) format. The data collected in this way were divided into several classes, which are specified below.

- **Adware**—applications that display advertisements, often infecting the operating system to spam with advertisements even after closing the application.
- **Banking malware**—programs aimed at obtaining information about credentials to banking applications, which consequently may pose the risk that an attacker breaks into a bank account and makes an unauthorized transfer of funds.

- **SMS malware**—software gaining control over access to SMS service, which can compromise the confidentiality of stored messages or allow the program to send messages without the consent of the device owner.
- **Mobile riskware**—high-risk applications characterized by the presence of a vulnerability, exploitation of which may lead to malicious activity, such as the installation of spyware or ransomware.
- **Benign**—other applications that do not present malicious behavior.

It is worth noting that the methodology proposed by the authors assumed semi-supervised learning using the pseudo-label method. It involved the use of a labeling training dataset to initially create a model, which was then used to label untagged samples. The manually labeled dataset was then combined with the dataset obtained in the previous phase to retrain the model.

Another approach to dynamic malware detection was proposed by Mercaldo et al. [38]. The authors use the system call traces generated by running applications to generate an image—the process is shown in Fig. 6. The images are then further analyzed by a fuzzy DL network, which—with high accuracy—is capable of detecting malware-infected applications. The application testing process is presented in Fig. 7.

4.3 Phishing detection

Phishing attacks can be classified as social engineering attacks, which consist of manipulating the victim to take advantage of a given malware, giving the impression of being a legitimate software. Depending on the severity of these attacks, both non-technical people who do not know the characteristics of legitimate software, and slightly more experienced users, can be exposed to these attacks. As statistics show, this is one of the most effective methods of stealing private data on the internet, which can even lead to the victim's funds being stolen from their bank account. For this reason, it is essential to improve the warning systems against such attacks. This can be achieved, for example, by developing a dedicated ML classifier that, based on the Uniform Resource Locator (URL) of a given website or its HTML and JavaScript content, will be able to identify malicious intentions of the displayed user interface.

Rashid et al. [39] proposed a technique to automate the feature extraction phase using the *wget* tool and a script written in *Python 3*. With the help of *wget*, it was possible to download the webpage in order to analyze its content represented by `.html`, `.css`, or `.js` files, as well as to preserve the information contained in the headers of the Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) protocol. On the other hand, *Python 3* can be used to parse the received data, as well as to extract from the URL itself some characteristics indicating the presence of phishing,



Fig. 6 Process of system call trace-based image generation from [38].



Fig. 7 Process of model testing for malware detection from [38].

such as unusual characters that separate words in the domain name. The developed training dataset was used to create a classifier model based on the SVM algorithm, the accuracy of which was 95.66%.

Salahdine et al. [40] developed its own phishing detection system based on sending the victim a URL that leads to a malicious website. They proposed 10 features on the basis of which the system identified suspicious emails. These included, among others: information about the existence of the secure sockets encryption layer and the Certificate Authority, blacklist with phrases that impose pressure on the victim, Fully Qualified Domain Name (FQDN) analysis, etc. All these features had a binary value, e.g., each e-mail is assigned the presence or absence of a given feature. The authors then tested three classification algorithms: SVM, LogR, and ANN with different parameters. As shown by the conducted experiments, the ANN algorithm works best, with an accuracy of 94.5%

Karim et al. [41] proposed a hybrid approach to the detection of phishing URLs called *"LSD"* with canopy feature selection. The name comes from the combination of models: LinR, SVM, and DT. Performance was evaluated based on accuracy, precision, recall, and F1score, but also execution time, throughput, and latency. The hybrid approach outperformed its base algorithms, as well as RF, NB, and GBC.

4.4 Spam detection

One of the problems faced by all network users is spam. These are unwanted messages, often sent on a mass scale, that take up disk space and also require the attention of recipients. Usually, they are not dangerous from a security point of view, but they definitely reduce the comfort of using given websites or application. There are methods to limit the reach of spam messages, which are most often based on filtering messages that have been marked as spam by other users. Unfortunately, these methods do not solve the problem of small-scale spam and new versions of spam. In addition, it happens that a message that is not spam will be mistakenly classified as spam and will not reach the recipient. Some of these problems are solved by the ML approach, which is described below.

Khorashizadeh et al. [42] proposed a spam detection system in SMS messages based on DL. The proposed method uses the Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) and Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) algorithms for the feature creation and feature extraction phases. Then, the features separated this way are used for supervised learning with the use of the SVM algorithm. The research carried out on the data obtained as a result of the survey, which contained a total of 4,411 non-spam messages and 1,906 spam messages, confirmed the effectiveness at the level of more than 97%. Importantly, indicators such as precision, recall, and F1score also amounted to a high value of more than 95%, which proves the effectiveness of the developed solution.

Raza et al. [22] presented a comprehensive review of email spam classification using ML algorithms. According to research, the vast majority of AI-based spam detection systems use a supervised learning approach based on multiple ML algorithms. In case of this type of systems, it is relevant to properly select the feature set on the basis of which classifiers are developed. In this context, the bag-of-word is the most popular. It consists of

calculating the number of occurrences of individual words in the text and then saving the results obtained in the form of a structured list, for example using JSON. When it comes to the use of algorithms, the most frequently used are NB, DT, and SVM. The average accuracy of the systems developed in this way exceeds 90%.

Sumathi and Raja [43] compared standard spam detection algorithms to solutions called Extra Tree Classifier (ETC) and Voting Classifier (VC). Both of these solutions outperformed other algorithms in accuracy, precision, recall, and F1score of detection based on specified dataset. Between these two, VC had better result of recall, while ETC had better results of the remaining performance metrics. Similar research has been conducted by Byeon et al. [44]—the authors proposed a solution that outperformed other detection algorithms in a few different datasets.

4.5 Endpoint detection and response

Conventional antiviruses were systems designed to prevent a victim from launching malicious software on a given operating system. Like HIDS-type systems, they operate mainly on the basis of known malware signatures. In addition, these types of application were able to scan files stored on the device in order to verify recently accessed files, which in turn might suggest the presence of a rootkit, i.e., malware embedded in the operating system. However, similar to the standard signature-only HIDS, they suffered from a limited ability to detect 0-day attacks as well as intentionally obfuscated malware. For this reason, the concept of NGAV was introduced, which extended the standard antivirus functionality provided by ML.

Nevertheless, even NGAV with currently used network architects turns out to be insufficient because it is limited to the protection of a particular host. IoT devices connected inside the home local network, autonomous vehicles, and data centers consisting of dozens of virtual machines or containers in constant communication using APIs, are only selected examples of end-device networks for which a single approach to preventing threats is ineffective. For this reason, emerged the idea to create an Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR), expanding the capabilities of NGAV in order to protect the entire environment composed of many connected devices, and not only the individual operating system that is part of it. This type of system can be implemented partially in the cloud where the protected devices connect to and partially on the end devices themselves. Thanks to this, it is possible to aggregate information about the entire environment in one place, as well as transfer some of the computations related to the protection operation, from the level of the protected device to the external computing cloud.

Sjarif et al. [45] discussed the trends in EDR solutions and justified the key role played by the use of AI in them. The authors indicated commercial platforms that implement the discussed functionalities, among them there are: *Symantec Endpoint Protection*, *Webroot Endpoint Protection*, *Carbon Black Response*. According to the research carried out in this publication, the three most frequently selected ML algorithms for this type of application are RF, SVM, LogR.

Other approaches include a hybrid of NIDS, Software-Defined Network, and ML presented by AlMasri et al. [46] or a ML-based heuristic algorithms presented by Iwabuchi and Nakamura [47]. Both solutions create new detection signatures based on detected anomalies and trained models.

4.6 Internet-of-Things security

As current trends in the IT industry show, the number of devices connected to the network to allow the user to remotely control using an application is constantly growing. This type of device includes, for example, apartment lighting, microcomputers measuring temperature and air quality, TVs, refrigerators, automatic vacuum cleaners, and many others. They make up a network of connected hosts known as IoT. Their constantly increasing popularity undoubtedly results from the simplicity and convenience of managing them, often completely remotely from the Wide Area Network (WAN) level. In addition, because of the low demand for computing resources, these devices are often relatively inexpensive. Unfortunately, due to the development costs optimization of these

types of devices, they are very often designed in a manner inconsistent with current cybersecurity standards, which results in the presence of numerous vulnerabilities, often with high severity level. For this reason, the number of attacks against IoT devices is growing. In addition, sophisticated tools and frameworks are being developed that allow attackers to exploit vulnerabilities in an automated manner.

Meneghello et al. [48] discussed in detail the security threats that real IoT devices can be exposed and the ways in which it is possible to mitigate the risk. Among the described solutions, there are involved ML algorithms, mainly for the IDS purposes. The problem with the limited resources of IoT devices has been partially resolved thanks to its combination with techniques such as software-defined networking (Susilo and Sari [49]), distributed learning (Bhardwaj et al. [50]), or ensemble DL (Alrefaei and Ilyas [51]).

In this context, Alsarhan et al. in [52] proposed an approach aimed at improving cyberthreat detection in IoT environments by using Artificial Bee Colony (ABC)-based hyperparameter optimization for machine learning models, made a notable contribution. Their method demonstrates how bioinspired optimization algorithms can significantly improve the accuracy and efficiency of intrusion detection systems, especially when dealing with the resource-constrained nature of IoT devices. This type of optimization allows better adaptation of the detection models to the dynamic and heterogeneous nature of IoT networks.

In case of IoT environments, great attention is also paid to solving the problem of botnets, that is, networks composed of intercepted devices that can be used, for example, to carry out DOS attacks. Undoubtedly, this was due to numerous attacks carried out with the use of botnets composed of IoT devices, one of the most popular of which was *MIRAI*, consisting of more than 600,000 hosts, observed in 2016. Thanks to ML and DL (Lanitha et al. [53], Gandhi and Li [54], Jeelani et al. [55]), it should be possible to prevent similar incidents in the future.

4.7 Cloud security

The use of cloud computing for data processing is another trend in the IT sector that is developing dynamically. This is due to a number of advantages of moving services directly to the cloud, instead of using private infrastructure for this purpose. Among them, there is the reduction of costs related to the provision of services, because it is paid only for the number of computing resources that are required. Additionally, cloud solutions can provide data loss prevention using appropriate data storage techniques, as well as disaster recovery, i.e., the ability to restore the functionality of a given application after a failure.

However, the use of cloud computing is also associated with additional risks related to the fact that at least some of the interfaces hosted in cloud applications are publicly available from the WAN level, in the form of an API or other network service. Additionally, confidential data are stored on disk arrays in remote locations. These factors direct the attention to the cybersecurity of these solutions, including the issues of protection against Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks and data privacy.

There are many ways to increase the level of cloud computing security in which ML is used. Nassif et al. [56] analyzed more than 60 research articles on the use of AI in the context of cloud computing security. These publications often referred to the issues of DDOS and data privacy, which were raised in 16% and 14% of the analyzed articles, respectively. Among the solutions, ML classifiers were most often used, and the most frequently implemented algorithm was SVM.

It is also worth to mention the innovative LinR outsourcing presented by Zhang et al. [57]. This approach allows to move the complex operations to cloud and, as a result, be able to train the LinR much faster, without a threat of security breach. In the proposed scheme, the data are obscured, so it is secure from any unwanted usage. The result of the computations is verified by an algorithm proposed by the authors. Additionally, the fairness factor has been implemented on blockchain—the cloud provider gets paid only if the outsourced workload was executed correctly.

Archana et al. in [58] present the application of machine learning techniques for detecting and mitigating XSS attacks within cloud computing infrastructures. The authors develop a novel framework that leverages the extraction of features from HTTP requests combined with supervised learning algorithms such as SVM, RF, or

DT. The research results indicated that the SVM-based model achieved the highest detection accuracy, outperforming traditional rule-based filtering methods, commonly used in web application firewalls. In addition to detecting the attacks, the framework provides a real-time response mechanisms, making it suitable for dynamic, large-scale cloud environments.

4.8 Autonomous cars security

Autonomous vehicles have undoubtedly the potential to revolutionize the automotive industry by reducing the impact of human error on communication accidents. They do not require the driver's constant attention in the analysis of the current situation around the car, other vehicles, traffic rules in force on a given road section, and many other factors. Additionally, such vehicles do not have a tendency to break traffic regulations, which in result mitigates some possible threats for the passengers, as well as other road users. Unfortunately, they are not free of disadvantages, the most important of which in the context of cybersecurity include adversarial learning attacks and the security of Vehicular ad-hoc Network (VANET) communication.

Adversarial ML is a huge threat in the context of a driverless car. It plays a key role because these types of vehicles actively use ML to make decisions about driving. For this reason, they require the implementation of prevention methods that will allow us to solve or reduce this problem. There are two main ways to reduce the risk of an adversarial learning attack. The first of them assumes an increase in the robustness of the classifier by performing supervised learning using adversarial input data, while the second relies on the detection of adversarial samples. Fidel et al. [59] proposed a method to detect adversarial samples based on *Shapley Additive Explanations*, which was used to protect the classifier developed on the basis of Deep Neural Network (DNN) against adversarial learning attacks. The developed method assumed generating the Explainable artificial intelligence (XAI) signatures database on the basis of the collected samples, both normal and adversarial, and then created a binary classifier based on them, which was used to detect adversarial samples.

VANET, on the other hand, is a network of vehicles in the immediate vicinity, which aims to exchange information on the traffic situation. The information made available in this way gives vehicles a better picture of threats, thanks to which they can better adjust their own speed and trajectory to the circumstances. However, the wireless local area network interface developed in this way, consisting of two main components: *vehicle-to-vehicle* and *vehicle-to-infrastructure*, can be compromised by an attacker who deliberately misleads the vehicle by providing false information. Hence, there are developed IDS systems designed to prevent such incidents. Scalas and Giacinto [60] proposed to use ML-based IDS to detect malicious messages provided by VANET. In addition, the authors explain the role of XAI in improving various aspects of the safety of autonomous vehicles, which enables the design of systems more resistant to such types of attacks. Another approach for secure communication between autonomous vehicles using reinforcement learning has been described by Yoshizawa et al. [61].

4.9 Fake news detection

One aspect of cybersecurity is ensuring the authenticity of information processed by different systems. This includes preventing the spread of so-called fake news, i.e., false information, which is often widely shared to manipulate recipients. The ability to identify fake news is a challenging task, as evidenced by various types of research (Mladenova and Valova [62]). For this reason, there was a need to automate the process of detecting fake news in order to report them and thus reduce their harmful impact on the society. One of the ways to deal with the problem of fake news detection is to use AI for this purpose. As has been proven in many publications (Park and Chai [63], Nirmala and Navya [64], Ashish et al. [65]), fake news detection can be performed using ML classifiers. The classifier development process is similar to the phishing detection system described in Sect. 4.3. Having a set of information marked manually as true or false, in the first step, they are processed in order to remove unnecessary punctuation marks, emoji, etc. Then the feature extraction process is performed, during

which *Term Frequency Inverse Document Frequency (TF-IDF)* can be used to develop a dictionary with the most frequently occurring word sequences (Saranya et al. [66]). The data processed in this way are used in the learning process to develop a classifier, whose accuracy can exceed 90%.

4.10 Intellectual property

Data poisoning is already mentioned in Section 3.2.1 as a threat related to AI usage. This process can also be very helpful due to new challenges in today's world. One of them is being widely available AI-based image generators, such as *DALL-E*, *Midjourney*, or *Stable Diffusion*. While they are very useful for typical internet user, if their dataset consists of copyrighted images available in the internet, they are harmful in the context of violating the copyrights of creators.

Shan et al. [67] propose a solution that allows altering images files in a way that for a human it would look the same as the original, but for AI it would be beyond recognizable. The development of such tools will allow the authors to have their intellectual property still available as before, while being secure from becoming an unwanted contribution to AI image generators development.

While AI may be used to save texts, photographs, or artworks from unwanted usage, in today's world the ML models may also be classified as intellectual property. An approach of securing availability of learning models was presented by Ren et al. [68]. The authors propose a new solution in which the modification is not based on inserting secret information in the model (e.g., in watermarking process), but instead editing the model to decrease its accuracy when a specific token is not included in the input data. This approach allows authorized users to use the model in its full capability, while limiting unwanted usage. The difference between the accuracy of the authorized and unauthorized data (with different poisoning ratio) is presented in Fig. 8.

4.11 Deepfake Recognition

Deepfake is one of the most dangerous threats that arose as a result of the use of AI for advanced sound and image processing. It consists of generating photographs, sounds, or even videos that represent events that never occurred. To achieve that, two techniques are usually used: auto-encoder and Generative Adversarial Networks (GAN). Materials developed in this way can be used in social engineering attacks to deceive people who did not notice the difference between the characters presented on deepfake and the actual characters. An example of this type of attack is the fraud carried out in 2019, in which, as a result of impersonating a high-ranking person, a transfer of funds in the amount of 243,000 € was ordered by phone [69]. Another example of abuse for which deepfake can be used is the creation of an artificial identity. For this purpose, one can use, for example, a website: https://thispersondoesnotexist.com that is capable of generating portraits of people who indeed do not exist.

Due to the above-mentioned threats, it is necessary to limit the possibility of generating deepfakes. These types of regulations are successively introduced, an example is Google blocking the possibility of creating deepfake in their cloud computing environment: *Google Colab* [70]. However, these types of actions are not enough to counteract the negative effects of deepfake generation. Hence, there are many proposals of ML-based solutions to



Fig. 8 Accuracy rate of the learning model with different poisoning ratio from [68].

identify deepfake objects (Agarwal et al. [71], Rafique et al. [72], Kang et al. [73]). In most cases, they focus on detecting artifacts among features extracted from files, on the basis of which it is possible to determine the authenticity of such material.

The research papers listed above are mostly oriented on detection of deepfaked images. As already mentioned in this section, voice deepfakes may be just as serious a threat. Sun et al. [74] presented a solution to detect the synthetic human voice by searching the traces of neural vocoders in the signal. This means that in this case the usage of NN-based solutions during the deepfake-making process allows us to differentiate a real voice from a fake one. The solution has a high performance compared to other popular methods of detection. Mcuba et al. [75] compared the performance results of multiple CNN-based models with different visual presentations of the frequency spectrum. This allowed to present which solutions work better in specific cases, as the choice of a model may differ depending on the training/test dataset used.

Khan and Malik [76] presented a solution for detection of voice deepfakes, including unseen attacks. This approach is essential to ensure the reliability of systems, such as voice-based security. The presented approach utilizes a CNN-based LSTM for one-shot learning. Comparable solutions from the most recent papers were tested along with the new approach, and the proposed solution had the best performance in the detection of unseen attacks, with a detection rate of ≈86%.

4.12 Penetration Tests

One of the most effective ways to detect vulnerabilities and determine their severity is to conduct penetration testing. They consist of several stages, and their methodology reflects the actions taken by real cybercriminals trying to compromise the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of data processed by a given host. Thanks to this approach, a cybersecurity expert may be able to find critical vulnerabilities, prepare an appropriate report, and patch them before they are used by the real attacker. To perform penetration testing, a number of automated tools as well as well-known exploitation techniques are used. However, despite the fact that the approach to conducting this type of test is quite standard, it cannot be automated in a simple way because finding a specific vulnerability entails some possibilities of its exploitation, which in turn require the use of additional precise actions.

It is possible to automate this type of activity using AI, as demonstrated by Confido et al. [77]. They used reinforcement learning to automate *PenBox*, a framework that provides automated chain penetration testing tools [78]. Thanks to the use of reinforcement learning, it was possible to fully rule out human interference in the process of conducting penetration tests, the effect of which was to determine the sequence of techniques to be used in subsequent steps to compromise a given system. Due to the imposed limitations, the presented proof-of-concept was not able to precisely discover all the cyber-kill chains present in the tested environment. Additionally, in case of the cyber-kill chains discovered, the number of steps required to compromise was much greater than the realistically minimum number needed to complete the task. However, the methodology presented proved the possibility of automating the entire process.

4.13 Cryptanalysis

Cryptography is an inherent element of cybersecurity, through which it is possible to ensure the confidentiality of data. However, not all data encryption methods are equally secure, as some techniques may be easier to decrypt compared to others. One of the methods of evaluating the degree of security of a ciphertext is calculating the number of active *S-boxes*. Lee et al. [79] used this technique to develop a classifier that allowed the security assessment of *Lightweight Block Cipher*. In the conducted experiments, the authors examined the accuracy of both linear and nonlinear classifiers. In addition, the research was carried out in two ways: In the first case, the same block ciphers were used in both the training and test datasets, while the second case assumed testing on data not used in the learning process. For this case, the best accuracy was achieved by the nonlinear classifiers in the form of DT and KNN, which reached 93% and 92%, respectively. In the second phase of the experiment, DT and

KNN again showed the highest accuracy, but this time their results were much lower—67% and 74%, respectively.

Another application for ML in the cryptanalysis process was introduced by Jeong et al. [80]. The authors presented a classifier model based on the RNN, which determines the cryptographic algorithm used only on the basis of ciphertext. Some of the most popular encryption algorithms have been tested, including Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), Blowfish, or Data Encryption Standard (DES). The model has been tested on the basis of ciphertext in four operation modes: CBC, CFB, OFB, and CTR. The model has been tested on two different datasets, achieving an accuracy greater than 85% and 92% for each operation mode in the first and second dataset, respectively. For some operation modes, the accuracy was as high as 99%.

Tolba et al. [81] analyzed current approaches of ML applications to cryptanalysis and presented a possible perspective for the future, including quantum and hybrid approaches (classical and quantum). Based on the pace of quantum computing research, such approaches may (and should) become more popular in the near future.

4.14 Authentication and Authorization

Authentication and authorization are two inherent aspects of cybersecurity, dealing successively with confirming the identity of a given user and granting them appropriately defined rights and restrictions. Thanks to this, it is possible to maintain the confidentiality and integrity of the data stored by a given system. One of the methods of authentication is biometrics, i.e., the use of unique biological characteristics of a given person to confirm their identity. Such characteristics include fingerprint, face, ear shape, voice, etc. In order to use them in the authentication process, it is necessary to develop a system that will first read biometric characteristics and transform them into digital form (for instance, by taking a photograph, recording a sound, or using another sensor) and then from the collected dataset relatively quickly and unambiguously extract a set of features to be verified. For this purpose, ML can be used to recognize patterns, particularly in the context of image processing and sound.



Fig. 9 Diagram of authentication process from [84].

Ferrag et al. [82] presented an overview of the solutions used for authentication and authorization for mobile IoT devices using bio-features. A significant part of the approaches discussed by the author used ML solutions. There are varying approaches to ML-based bio-recognition systems. An example of such a system has been presented by Ghoualmi and Benkechkache [83]. The authors developed a face recognition system that uses both clustering and classifying algorithms. The system first processes the images with multiple ML models, each of which has different features of importance. The output is evaluated based on weighted scores, classified using SVM. Although the results were not groundbreaking, the solution had slightly better accuracy than any of the models used in the processing phase alone.

AlQahtani et al. [84] presented an innovative wireless network-based two-factor authentication solution. The mechanism, after validation of the user's credentials, instead of asking the user to provide some code or to accept a prompt in the authenticator app, instead verifies the location of user's devices, by triggering the devices to collect connection data such as signal strength, and utilizes a ML model to verify if the user should be given access. The diagram of the system configuration and the authentication process is presented in Fig. 9. In addition to the initial automated authentication, the proposed solution is also capable of verifying continuous access, greatly increasing the security of this approach.

5 Conclusion

This paper presents various implementations of AI in the field of cybersecurity. Initially, the concept of AI was brought up, providing an overview of the most popular implementations and algorithms. Subsequently, both the challenges and opportunities of AI usage were reviewed. The review covers a wide range of perspectives, including research-oriented issues and opportunities (such as the problem with feature correlation in testing and training datasets, or *ML* for cloud security), as well as commercial and personal examples (such as the problem of backdoor attacks or the ability to detect phishing and spam). The main objective of this work was to present both positive and negative aspects of AI in cybersecurity, as while new technologies can bring new, very prominent possibilities to ensure security in the network, they at the same time introduce new unexpected risks and threats. By examining both sides of the coin, this paper shows how ML can play a dual role in the security field, enabling advanced protective mechanisms and also opening doors to novel attack vectors. The findings of this study provide a broader perspective on the areas where ML and AI-related technologies may be widely adopted in the future, as well as on the key areas that require further development to protect themselves from new types of threats.

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Data Availability Full results of the research conducted for the purpose of this publication are available on the project's GitHub website (link is referenced in the manuscript text).

Declarations

Conflict of interest The authors declare no financial or non-financial conflict of interest.

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Authors and Affiliations

Pawel Czaja[1] · Bartlomiej Gdowski[1] · Marcin Niemiec[1] · Wim Mees[2] · Nikolai Stoianov[3] · Konstantinos Votis[4] · Vyacheslav Kharchenko[5] · Vasilis Katos[6] · Matteo Merialdo[7]

✉ Bartlomiej Gdowski
bgdowski@agh.edu.pl

✉ Marcin Niemiec
niemiec@agh.edu.pl

Pawel Czaja
pawel.czaja.priv@gmail.com

Wim Mees
w.mees@cylab.be

Nikolai Stoianov
n.stoianov@di.mod.bg

Konstantinos Votis
kvotis@iti.gr

Vyacheslav Kharchenko
v.kharchenko@csn.khai.edu

Vasilis Katos
vkatos@bournemouth.ac.uk

Matteo Merialdo
m.merialdo@nexovagroup.eu

[1] AGH University of Krakow, Mickiewicza 30, 30-059 Krakow, Poland

[2] Royal Military Academy, Reinassancelaan 30, 1000 Brussels, Belgium

[3] Bulgarian Defence Institute, Prof. Tzvetan Lazarov Blvd. 2, 1592 Sofia, Bulgaria

[4] Information Technologies Institute, Centre for Research and Technology Hellas, 6th km Charilaou - Thermi Road, 57001 Thessaloniki, Greece

[5] National Aerospace University "Kharkiv Aviation Institute", 17 Vadyma Manka, 61070 Kharkiv, Ukraine

[6] Bournemouth University, Fern Barrow, Poole BH12 5BB, UK

[7] Nexova Group, Rue des Etoiles 140, 6890 Libin, Belgium